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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an Order of Partial Summary Judgment
from

the

Third

Judicial

District

Court

of

Salt

Lake

County.

Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to Article 8 Section 9,
Constitution of Utah, Section 78-2-2 (i), Utah Code Annotated (1953)
and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case of Pate -vs- Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (1984)
defines the circumstances when a judgment which is not final may be
appealed, as provided in Rule 54(b).

On page 767 the Utah Supreme

Court states:
"First, there must be multiple claims of relief or multiples
parties to the action.

Second, the judgment appeal from must have

been entered on an order that would be appealable but for the fact
that other claims or parties remain in the action.

Third, the trial

court in, its discretion must make a determination that there is no
just reason for delay of the appeal."
In the above action there are multiple parties and multiple
claims.

The cause of action has arisen out of claims made prior to

October 1, 1986 and claims made subsequent to October 1, 1986.

The

Partial Summary Judgnent appealed would be appealable but for the
fact that other claims occurred after October 1, 1986 and remain in
the action. Finally on December 14f 1987 the Honorable Scott Daniels
signed an order stating that there is no just reason for delay of the
appeal of the Partial Summary Judgnent because the vast majority of
damages occurred before October 1, 1986. Therefore the Supreme Court
of Utah obtained jurisdiction under the direction of Rule 54(b).
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Following an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
issued an order on January 15f 1988 directing the Court of Appeals to
rule on the case.
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINS
This appeal is
Judicial

from a Partial Summary Judgiient in the Third

District Court wherein

Defendants-Respondents

Judge Daniels ordered

are granted

"partial summary

that the

judgiient, no

cause of action, with respect to any and all claims of the Plaintiffs
against the Defendants which arose prior to October 1, 1986, such
claims "being barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of
entry of the Small Claims Judgment identified above".

Plaintiffs-

Appellants appeal from the Partial Summary Judgiient under the theory
that the Small Claims Court had no jurisdiction or authority to rule
on any matters except the issue of lease payments that was pleaded by
the Plaintiffs-Appellants in Snail Claims Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether

the District

Court

errored

by granting a

Partial

Sundry Judgiient to Defendant-Respondents with respect to any and all
claims of the Plaintiffs-Appellants against Defendants-Respondents
which arose prior to October 1, 1986.
doctrine

of

res

occurred

when the

judicata

which

The judgnent was based on the

Defendants-Respondents

Small Claims Court

entered

alledged

a Judgment which

included the following language:
"No Sept. obligation owed because of the Plaintiffs failure to
take steps to reasonably mitigate damages. No further rent owing."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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This is an appeal taken from the Partial Summary Judgnent of
the District Court that found that the Defendants-Respondents were
entitled a judgnent against Plaintiffs-Appellants and that all claims
of the Plaintiffs-Appellants prior to October 1, 1986, were barred by
the doctrine of res judicata as a result of an entry of judgnent
filed in the Small Claims Court.

Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that

the Small Claims Court exceeded its jurisdiction in making its ruling
and therefore the doctrines of res judicata applies only to the lease
payments for the months of July, August and part of September.
On February 11, 1980, Plaintiffs-Appellants and DefendantsRespondents

entered

into

a lease

whereby

Defendants-Respondents

leased from the Plaintiffs-Appellants property located at 11255 East
Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On September 10, 1986, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Small
Claims Affidavit and Order (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A
in the Addendum) in which the Plaintiffs-Appellants claimed that the
Defendants-Respondents were indebted to the Plaintiffs-Appellants in
the sum of $1,000 for unpaid lease payments for July (in the amount
of $492.10), August (in the amount of $492.10) and $15-80 towards the
September

payment.

Defendants-Respondents

did

not

file

a

Counterclaim.
On October 21, 1986, a hearing on the above matter was held and
a Small Claims Judgnent (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B in
the Addendum) against the Defendants-Respondents in favor of the
Plaintiffs-Appellants was granted in the amount of $984.25 principal
plus court costs of $30 for a total judgnent of $1,014*25. However,
in addition to granting the judgment the judge also wrote "No Sept.
6

obligation owed because of Plaintiffs failure to take steps to
reasonably mitigate damages. Ko further rent owing."
On December 18, 1986, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a ccnplaint
in the Third Judicial District Court (a copy of which is attacned
hereto

as Exhibit C

in

the

Addendum).

In the

complaint the

Plaintiffs-Appellants asked for the following:
1.

For an amount of $984*25 for loss of lease payments (this

was in addition to the aiaoiint granted the Plaintiffs-Appellants in
the Small Claims Court).
2.

Judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $834.60

for taxes, $295*84 for sewer fee, and $165 for insurance, which the
lease required the Defendants-Respondents to pay.
3.

An amount of $22,923*89 plus costs to restore buildings

plus an additional $5i000 for landscaping so that the property could
be restored in substantially the same condition it was prior to the
Defendants-Respondents entering into the lease.
4-

$25,000 as compensation for mental and physical damages.

5.

Attorneys fees and court costs.

Defendants-Respondents

filed

an

Answer

and

Cross-Claim.

Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was
heard on October 25, 1987*

The Motion alleged that the Small Claims

Judgment resolved all issues concerning the lease prior to October 1,
1986.

Judge Scott Daniels granted the Defendants-Respondents Partial

Summary Judgnent with respect to ending all claims of the PlaintiffsAppellants which arose prior to October 1, 1986 (a copy of the
Partial Summary Judgment is included as Exhibit D in the Addendum).
Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed.
7

SUMiARY OP THE ARGUMENT
A Snail Claims Court is a court created by statute.

As a

statutory court it only has power specifically granted to it by the
act creating it.

The jurisdiction of Small Claims Court is limited

to the claims of money only in the amount of up to 31,000.

The

Affidavit filed by the Plaintiffs-Appellants was filed correctly and
the Small Claims Court had jurisdiction over whether rents were due
for the months of July, August and part of September.

However, the

part of the order of the court stating that no September obligation
was owed because of the failure to take steps to reasonably mitigate
damages and that no further rent was owing under the lease was a
decision that was beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court
and therefore could not involk the doctrine of res judicata at the
District

Court

jurisdiction

level.

Also

the

Small

Claims

to hear the above matters because

Court

has

no

the Defendants-

Respondents did not file a Counterclaim in Small Claims Court.
The District Court errored in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applied to all damages which occured before October 1, 1986.
Therefore the Partial Summary Judgpient should be set aside and the
court

should

be

instructed

to try

the

issues

outlined

in the

complaint and Counterclaim*
DETAIL OP THE ARGUMENT
Small Claim Courts were statutorily created under Section 78-61 throu^i 15 of Utah Code Annotated (1953)•

Section 78-6-1 states:

!!

(1) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's

courts of this state, a department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS COURT,"
which has jurisdiction, but not exclusive, in cases:
8

a.

for the recovery of money where the amount claimed

does not exceed $1f000 and where the defendant resides or the action
of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in
which the action is to be maintained; or
b.

involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed
the jurisdiction of the court."
"The Small Claims Court Act (the Act) was established in the
legislature to make it possible to dispose of certain actions in an
informal manner from their inception to their end with the sole
object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties.
claims court is totally a creature of statute.

The small

Its jurisdiction is

not exclusive and is limited to the recovery of money up to $1,000."
Faux -vs- Kickelsen at 725 Pacific 2nd 1372, p. 1374- (1986).
In the present case the Plaintiffs-Appellants properly filed
their claim for relief in the Snail Claims Court because their claim
was for money damages and the amount sought was not in excess of
$1,000.

Therefore the Small Claims Court obtained juristiction in

the case.

The Defendants-Respondents did not file a counterclaim.

The Small Claims Court then ruled

in favor of

the Plaintiffs-

Appellants in the amount of $984 plus costs.
Had the Small Claims Court stopped at this point then no error
would have been created. However, the court then added the following
language to the Srria.11 Claim Judgment.

"No Sept. obligation owed

because

take

of the

mitigate damages.

Plaintiffs

failure to

Eo further rent owing."

9

steps

to

reasonably

No transcripts are taken of ana.ll Claims Court proceedings so
there is no way to determine how the Small Claims Court reached such
the decision cited above.

It is the contention of Plaintiffs-

Appellants that the Small Claims Court never had jurisdiction over
the issues of mitigation of damages and what additional rents were
incurred.

In Mann -vs- Morrison cited at 144 P«2d 543 (1943)» "the

Utah Supreme Court quotes from page 545 > Justice Wolfefs language in
the Atwood -vs- Cox case.

"Many definitions of jurisdiction are

given in 15 C.J. 723 SS 13. They all mean, fundamentally, the power
or capacity given by the law to a court, tribunal, board, body, or
officer to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. * *
* It does not mean that the court must speak correctly by the law.
What it says may be incorrect. * * *It takes a pleading to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court, but, if the pleading shows that the cause
or controversy relates to a subject-matter over which the court has
jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction of the court is effective for the
purpose of proceeding with the cause or controversy.11

In the same

opinion at page 452 of the Utah report, at page 3&4 of 55 P*2d, it is
said:

"It would appear that excess of jurisdiction means a case in

which

the

court

has

initially

proceeded

properly

within

its

jurisdiction but steps out of the jurisdiction in the making of some
order or in the doing of some judicial act."
Jurisdiction is then the power or capacity given by the law to
the court to entertain, hear and determine certain controversy's.
Because the Small Claims Court is totally a creature of statute, its
jurisdiction is not exclusive but is limited to claims for money

10

only.

Kapetanov -vs- Small Claims Court of Ogden, 659 P2d 1049

(1983).
V<hen the Small Claims Court began considering issues such as
the responsibility of Plaintiff to mitigate damages under the terms
of the lease and further determined that no rent was owing under the
lease for any claims prior to October 1, 1986 then

it clearly

exceeded its jurisdiction because it was deciding issues concerning
Real Estate and deciding issues for monetary amounts in excess of
$1,000.

Therefore the Snail Claims Court had no jurisdiction over

these matters.
The reason the Plaintiffs-Appellants limited their claim before
the Snail Claims Court to the failure to make lease payments for July
and August and a portion of September was that that amount owed
equalled $1,000.

This was the highest amount of money damages that

the court could consider.

Additional lease payments were owed but

Plaintiffs-Appellants could not proceed with those claims in Small
Claims Court without violating the jurisdiction of the court.
Plaintiffs-Appellants

didn't

have

jurisdiction

to

If the

plead

for

additional damages, certainly the Small Claims Court could not involk
jurisdiction over monetary amounts in excess of $1,000.
The second reason that the Small Claims Court exceeded its
jurisdiction was that the Defendants-Respondents did not file a
Counterclaim before the Small Claims Court.

Section 78-6-10 Utah

Code Ann.(1953) outlines the Plaintiffs right of appeal in Small
Claims Court.

"The judgment of said court shall be conclusive upon

the Plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been interposed".

The case

of Lieatke v. Schettler 649 P.2d 80 reviewed the constitutionally of
11

Section 78-6-10.

The court ruled that the limitation of Plaintiff's

right to appeal is not in violation of the guarantee in Article I,
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and therefore is enforcable.
Defendants-Respondents failure to file a Counterclaim prevents them
by statute from having any issue heard except the issue presented by
the Plaintiff.

In Paux -vs- Mikelson 725 P2d. 1372 (1966) the Utah

Supreme Court ruled that a Counterclaim need not be filed by the
Defendants in Small Claims Court, but could be filed in Circuit or
District Court.

They therefore concluded that the failure to file a

Counterclaim at the Small Claims Court level and then filing a
Counterclaim in a higher court was not prevented by the doctrine of
res judicata.

Ey not filing a Counterclaim in Small Claims Court,

the Defendants-Respondents elected to have these issues heard by a
higher court.
Defendants-Respondents failure to file a Counterclaim in Small
Claims Court prevented the court from considering any issues except
the money damages pleaded by the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Any claims

made by the Defendants-Respondents would have to be tried in District
Court

when

the

Defendant-Respondents

raised

the

issues

by

Counterclaim.
In Peterson -vs- Peterson cited at 645 P*2d 37 (1982), the Utah
Supreme Court states on Pages 38 and 39 that "Res judicata applies to
bar the relitigation of issues which were actually litigated or could
have been litigated in the prior proceeding."

After examining the

conduct of the Small Claims Court, it is clear that the issues
concerning the terms and conditions of the lease and other rents were
not properly litigated and could not have been litigated in the Small
12

Claims Court without the court exceeding its jurisdiction.
the District Court

errored

Therefore

in ruling that the doctrine

of res

judicata prevented the Plaintiffs-Appellants from litigating issues
which arose prior to October 1, 1986.
CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiffs-Appellants pray that the Partial Summary Judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court be reversed and the District Court
be ordered to hold a trial in which the Plaintiffs-Appellants and the
Defendants-Respondents may litigate all the issues concerning the
lease, including rents, and damages thereof except for the July,
August and part of September rents that was properly litigated in the
Snail Claims Court.
DATED this 25th day of April, y&&.
9<4%v- J
^s&tev'en L. 'Godwin

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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2.

Robert Mitchell, Personally
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w^te^en L. Godwi
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ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AKD STATUTES

78-2-1.5

JUDICIAL CODE

Membership on state law library board,
« 37 1 1
TrocoodingH
unuifcclud
by • vucuucy,
$ 78-7-21

Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art.
VIII. Stir. 7
Kolirumont, Uluh Cutwl., Art. VUI, Hoc. 15,
$ 49-7a-l et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30.
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
&§ 67, 68.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 465; 48A C.J.S.
Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

78-2-1.5.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, > 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court

78-2-1.6.

Key Numbers. — Courts *» 101, 248;
Judges *» 1, 7 to 12.

justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch.
134, § 1; 1981, ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch.
267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1988],
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and

SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

(if orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original uppellute jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1,
1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;

UCU1UU

78-6-12 5
78-6-13

Abstract of judgment for defendant
— Form
Filing of abstract and docketing of
judgment

78-6-14
78-6-15

Fees
Costs

78-6-1. Creation — Jurisdiction — Counsel not necessary
— Deferring multiple claims of one plaintiff.
(1) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's courts of this state, a
department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS COURT," which has jurisdiction,
but not exclusive, in cases:
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed does not exceed $1,000 and where the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness
was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to
be maintained; or
(b) involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in which the amount claimed does not exceed the jurisdiction
of the court.
(2) Persons or corporations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in
person or through authorized employees with or without counsel.
(3) If person or corporation files multiple claims in any one small claims
court, the clerk or judge of the court may remove all but the initial claim from
the court's calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims court matters.
Claims so removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the court's calendar.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-1; L. 1953, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch.
180, § 1; 1969, ch. 256, § 1; 1970, ch. 26, § 1;
1977, ch. 77, § 61; 1977, ch. 78, § 28; 1983,
ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 48, § 1; 1986, ch. 187,
§ 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment increased the amount from $400 to $600
in the first sentence, and added Subsection (2)
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch 48
designated the former first sentence in the formerly undesignated first paragraph as Subsections (1) and (l)(a), designated the former second sentence in the formerly undesignated
first paragraph as subsection (2), redesignated

former Subsection (2) as present Subsection
(3), made a series of minor stylistic changes
throughout Subsection (1), deleted "onh" following "money" in Subsection (l)(a), and inserted Subsection (1Kb)
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch 187
in Subsection (1) substituted "$1,000" for
"$600' and made minor word changes throughout
This section is set out as reconciled b\ the
Office of Legislative 'Research and General
Counsel
Cross-References. — Circuit courts,
§ 78-4-1 et seq
Justices' courts, § 78-5-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action by corporation
—Necessity for attorney.
Jurisdiction
—Concurrent
—Fraud or misrepresentation
Action by corporation.
—Necessity for attorney.
Even though a corporation was a "person"

v>hich could maintain an action in a small
claims court, a corporation could not practice
lav* and an officer or employee of a corporation
could not properly institute an action in the

170

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 31.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 291.
Key Numbers. — Courts «=» 176, 181.

78-6-9. Judgment against defendant — Payment.
If the judgment or order be against the defendant, he shall pay the same
forthwith or at such times and upon such terms and conditions as the justice
or court shall prescribe.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-9.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 31.
C.J.S. — 21 CJ.S Courts § 291.
Key Numbers. — Courts «=> 176, 181.

78-6-10. Conclusiveness of judgment — Jurisdiction for
appeals.
(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the justices' and circuit
court is conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been interposed.
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the circuit
court, the defendant may appeal the judgment of the circuit court to the Court
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal within five days of the entry of the
judgment against him.
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the justices'
court, the defendant may obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court by filing in
the circuit court of the county a petition for trial de novo within five days of
the entry of the judgment against him.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-6-10; 1986, ch. 47, § 76.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment rewrote this section.

Cross-References. — Appeal from circuit
court to Court of Appeals, § 78-4-11.
Trial de novo, § 78-4-7.5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
—Limitation upon plaintiffs right to appeal.
—Time for filing notice of appeal
Time for appeal.
—Commencement.
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Circuit Court, State of Uta^
SALT 1AKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT
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AID HAXt F. AERIKCTON

. PMntitt
SMALL CLAIMS
JUDGMENT

LOLERT V. MITCHELL

Case No.

Defendant

860031055

SC

This matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavit of plaintiff, and the defendant has been
)6 with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defend, and return of service has been made. The
ring parties appeared at the hearing:
iainttff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set. and the defendant's default has been
ntered.
k>th
appeared
and presented evidence.
\h plaintiff and
ana defendant ap
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oth Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at Hearing.
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HE DEFENDANT ONLY:
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tne above judgment WBS granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in
ircuit Court in tne amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied with this judgment, you have only
(5) DAYS from receipt pf this notice to appeal the case to the District Court.
HE PLAINTIFF ONLY:
ou should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five
rom receipt of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the
at of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action.
hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above

5 taftnauitft; «,t „

Addratt 4 Zip Code
Dated
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Steven L. Godwin
Attorney for Plaintiff
4055 South 700 East, Suite 106
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-8395
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN E. ARRINGTON and MARY F.
ARRINGTON,

C O M P L A I N T

Plaintiffs,
-vsROBERT W. MITCHELL and KARQJ G.
IVERSEN.
Defendants,

civil NO.

6(r^lS^

judge Damiels

COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs John E. Arrington and Mary F. Arrington,
through their attorney, Steven L. Godwin, and complains against the Defendants
as follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

That the real estate of issue in this complaint, is located

Utah.

in the Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
3.

On or about February 11, 1980, the Plaintiffs and Defendants

entered into a lease (herein called lease), wherein the Plaintiffs leased the
property located at 1255 East Miller Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah to the
Defendants.

The leased property is hereinafter called property*

The lease

between the parties is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit M
4.

That on or about March 5, 1985 the Defendant's exercised the

first ten year option as outlined in the lease (a copy of the exercise to the
option is attached nereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein).

5.

On or

about

September

10, 1986

a

small

claims

court

complaint was filed by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants and on October 1,
1986, the small claims Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued
a judgnent in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,014.25.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 5 herein.

7.

That pursuant to paragraph 16 of the lease, the Plaintiffs

declared to the Defendants that the lease was terminated as of November 1,
1986 and on that day, the Plaintiff's re-entered
possession thereto.

the property

and took

Said termination was based on the following violations of

the lease:
a.

failure to make lease payments in excess of four (4) months.

b.

laying waste to the property

c.

abandoning the premises

d.

failing to pay for the utilities and services

e.

failing to comply with the laws and ordinance of Salt Lake

County concerning the maintenance of the property
f.

failing to maintain liability insurance on the property.

8.

That the Defendants owe the Plaintiffs in addition to the

judgment obtained in small claims court, monthly lease payments for September
and October of 1986 in a total amount of $984.25.
9.

Paragraph 18 of the lease requires that the Defaulting party

pay attorneys fees and court costs in order to enforce the lease agreement.
Plaintiffs have been required

to retain an attorney to collect the lease

payments and to otherwise enforce the lease agreement.

It is reasonable and

proper that the Defendants be required to pay attorneys fees and court costs
on this natter.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
10.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 9 herein.

11.

The provisions of the lease require the Defendants to pay

for taxes, utilities and insurance.

The

taxes that have acrued on the

property but have not been paid by the Defendants during the period in whicn
the lease was in full force and effect are $834.60.
and interest should be paid by the Defendants.

Said taxes plus penalty

The utility bills that have

not been paid by the Defendants during the period in which the lease was in
full force and effect is $295.84.

That amount plus interest is due and owing

by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs. Fire Insurance in the amount of $165.0C
insuring the back house for the period of April 1986 to April 1087 was paid by
the Plaintiffs.

That amount plus interest is due and owing to the Plaintiffs.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

12.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraph 1 through 11 herein.

13.

The

provision

of

the

lease

require

the

maintain the improvements on the property in good condition.

Defendants

to

However, the

defendants have wasted the property and allow the property to deteriorate and
be destroyed
14.

The Plantiffs have contacted Wally Bolden who has informed

them that it will cost $22,893.89 plus $30.00 for a bid to restore the
property in the condition it was prior to the lease. Therefore, the amount of
$22,923.89 should be paid to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant to restore the
property in the condition it was prior to the lease.

It is estimated that an

additional cost of $5,000.00 will be required to restore the landscaping which
was destroyed during the life of the lease.

Said amount should be paid by the

Defendants.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

15.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 14 herein.

16.

That it will take several months to repair the homes and

relandscape the property into the conditions that they were prior to the
lease*

It is reasonable and fair that the Defendants pay to the Plaintiffs a

monthly lease fee of $492.10 plus taxes and other costs until the property is
repaired to state of condition that it was prior to the lease.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
17.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 16 herein.

18.

That the Plaintiffs are a retired couple who depend upon the

income of the lease to maintain themselves in a reasonable manner.
19.

Because of their limited

income, the Plaintiffs depended

upon the lease income to maintain themselves in a reasonable fashion.

The

Defendants were aware of the importance of the lease payments to maintain the
Plaintiff's livelyhood and had an obligation of fairdealing and good faith
performance under the contract.
20.
and the

failure

Because of the wanten and willfull conduct of the Defendant
to perform under the lease and

the distruction of the

premises, the Plaintiffs have suffered severe mental and emotional problems.
Such problems have caused loss of weight, mental anguish and mental and
physical health.

Because of these losses, the Plaintiffs have suffered losses

in the amount of $25,000 which should be paid to them by the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray as follows:
1.

For judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $984.25

for loss of lease payments.
2.

For

judgment

against

the Defendants

in the

amounts of

$834.60 for taxes whiich the Defendants failed to pay, $295.84 for sewer fees

which tne Defendants failed to pay and $165.00 for insurance which they failed
t o pay, plus i n t e r e s t and c o s t s .
3.

For the amount of $22,923.89 plus c o s t s and i n t e r e s t and

$5,000.00 for

landscaping to r e s t o r e the property in t h e condition i t was

p r i o r to the l e a s e .
4.

For an amount of $25,000 as compensation

for mental and

physical damage.
5.

For attorneys fees and court c o s t s .

6.

For such other r e l i e f as the court may deem j u s t and proper.

DATED t h i s j Y

day of December, 1986.

*ven hi Godwin
/Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s

7070 South
1850 E. SLC

I v e l l Construction Conpeny
1*302 So Mains Street Murray, Utah
82*107 TEL: 262-7751

Sept 15, 1980

Lessors:
Lessees:

81il21

John E# Arrington and
Mary F. Arrington Husband and wife.
Robert W« Mitchell a Married Man
Karen G. Iversen a Married Woman
RE: Lease

1255 E. Miller Ave Salt Lake CU7, Utah Salt Lake
County., dated Feb 11, 1980....ATTJENDUX TO SAID LEASE,

LI owing addi&nal property i s included on the Lease dated Feb 11, 1980:
Lng at a point 2U6.62 f e e t South and South 88 degrees 36 f West 518.12 feet from
it quarter corner of Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, S a l t Lake Base
vidian; and running thence South 88 degrees 30 f West \\6mhS feet to a point on a
5 foot radius curve to the l e f t (center bears North 76 degrees 2 7 f 1 0 t f East);
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve l5k»21 feetj thence North UJ8.13 feet
point of BEGDPflNa.
Dve l e g a l l y described property i s located West of the property on the original l e a s e ,
included i n the original Lease with the following terms:
Above described property i s included in the original Lease for the
rive years without additional chrage. Ho>*ever, the Lessees agree t o pay the Taxes
above property beginning Jan 1, 198$#
Also, the Lessees agree to increase the basic rent
> to $b75«00 and under no circumstances w i l l the rent be lower than
Lng March 1 , 1985#
All other conditions of the Lease dated Feb 1 1 ,
to the above described property., re. e. i« e. Consumer Price Index

;sso:

'John
mE
E. %TT±rt^am

fffo

Mary F # ArringtorT

J
>*v

Lessees:

n

beginning March
Sii75»OC
I960 w i l l
increases

Robert W„ MJbchell

y^mft-/

Y \ Ujxiii^r(2625)
DENNIS K. POOLE
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant
Karen G. Iversen
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
Telephone (801) 263-3344

LJ..

J w'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN E. ARRINGTON and
MARY F. ARRINGTON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER OF PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT W. MITCHELL and
KAREN G. IVERSEN,

Civil No. 86-9482
Judge Daniels

Defendants.

Defendants Iversen*s and Mitchell's Motions For Summary
Judgment having come on for hearing before the Honorable
Scott Daniels on the 25th day of August, 1987, and the
Plaintiffs being represented by their attorney Steven L.
Godwin and the Defendant Karen G. Iversen being represented
by her attorney Dennis K. Poole and the Defendant Robert W.
Mitchell being represented by his attorney Loren E. Weiss
and the Court having considered the pleadings of the parties
and certified copies of a Small Claims Affidavit and Order

and a Small Claims Judgment entered October 1, 1986, in the
Circuit

Court,

State

of Utah,

Salt

Lake

Department, Case Number 860031055 SC, and

County,

Sandy

having heard the

arguments of counsel and finding that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to the claims of the Plaintiffs
which accrued prior to October 1, 1986, and for good cause
appearing
ORDERS that the Defendants, and each of them are hereby
granted partial summary judgment, no cause of action, with
respect to any and all claims of the Plaintiffs against the
Defendants which arose prior to October 1, 1986, such claims
being barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of
entry of the Small Claims Judgment identified above.
ORDER DATED this

\\

day of^tt^aftT 1987
BY THE COURT:

1

THE HONORAECE SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST

Depcry C»«*

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

& / day of August, 1987,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of
Partial Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid to
the following:
Steven L. Godwin, Esq.
4055 South 700 East, Suite 106
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Loren E. Weiss, Esq.
Midtown Office Plaza,
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

IVSN ORDER
PLEAD4
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